# Checking Russia's "Ukraine biolabs" documents

**Prepared 24 November 2026.** All dates below are conventional (Gregorian) dates. Every claim is tied to a document I opened, linked in the text and listed at the end. Where I could not open something, I say so.

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## 1. Bottom line

- **What is real and documented.** The US Defense Department (through DTRA's Biological Threat Reduction Program) has funded upgrades, equipment, training and some research at Ukrainian public-health, veterinary and Ministry of Defence sanitary-epidemiological labs since 2005. That came to about $200 million and 46 sites. The 2005 US–Ukraine agreement, a roughly $31.8 million DTRA / Black & Veatch contract (2015–2020), and research projects on migratory birds and bats are genuine documents. The US government itself acknowledges or publishes most of them.
- **What Russia added.** Russia read these documents as proof of a *biological weapons* program. Its reasoning rests on the choice of pathogens (anthrax, cholera, tularemia, Crimean-Congo fever), the size of strain collections, the Pentagon's role, a US patent for an insect-spreading drone, and drones and spray tanks it says it found. It also leaned on Ukrainian security-service memos that themselves use words like "likely" and "possible."
- **What no one has shown.** None of the documents Russia published shows weapon production, weaponisation, stockpiles or delivery systems tied to these labs. The same holds for anything linking them to COVID vaccines. The UN said it was "not aware" of any biological weapons programme, but it also said it had **no mandate or capacity to investigate**. At the treaty meeting in Geneva (September 2022), 42 states rejected Russia's case and 8 said questions remained. It ended with **"no consensus."** Russia's request for a UN Security Council investigation failed 2 to 3, with 10 abstentions.
- **Hunter Biden.** His firm's affiliate (Rosemont Seneca Technology Partners) did invest in Metabiota, a DTRA subcontractor. Laptop emails show he forwarded Metabiota to a Burisma executive in 2014 about a "Science Ukraine" idea. But the money for Metabiota's Ukraine work came *from* the Pentagon, not from Biden. Metabiota and DTRA said private investment did not fund that work. One of the emails says Metabiota's Ukraine funding had already stopped and it was looking for new money. Joe Biden is not shown funding anything.

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## 2. The documents, where they are, and what each is

| # | Document | File (under `primary_sources/`) | Original URL |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | UN Security Council meeting record, 11 March 2022 (S/PV.8991), Russia's first biolab meeting | `un_security_council/S_PV.8991.pdf` (+ `.txt`) | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/PV.8991&l=en&t=pdf |
| 2 | Security Council record, 18 March 2022 (S/PV.8999) | `un_security_council/S_PV.8999.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/PV.8999&l=en&t=pdf |
| 3 | Security Council record, 13 May 2022 (S/PV.9033) | `un_security_council/S_PV.9033.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/PV.9033&l=en&t=pdf |

| # | Document | File (under `primary_sources/`) | Original URL |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | Security Council record, 27 October 2022 (S/PV.9171), debate on Russia's Article VI complaint | `un_security_council/S_PV.9171.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/PV.9171&l=en&t=pdf |
| 5 | Security Council record, 2 November 2022 (S/PV.9180), the vote | `un_security_council/S_PV.9180.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/PV.9180&l=en&t=pdf |
| 6 | Russia's formal Article VI complaint letter, 24 October 2022 (S/2022/796), with its questions and draft resolution | `un_security_council/S_2022_796.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/2022/796&l=en&t=pdf |
| 7 | Russia's draft resolution (S/2022/821), not adopted | `un_security_council/S_2022_821.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/2022/821&l=en&t=pdf |
| 8 | Russian letter circulating Kirillov's 17 March 2022 briefing (A/76/764–S/2022/244) | `russia_letters_and_briefings/S_2022_244.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/2022/244&l=en&t=pdf |
| 9 | Russian letter circulating Kirillov's 31 March 2022 briefing, which includes the Hunter Biden claims (A/76/785–S/2022/284) | `russia_letters_and_briefings/S_2022_284.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/2022/284&l=en&t=pdf |
| 10 | Russian letter circulating Kirillov's 11 May 2022 briefing (A/76/836–S/2022/393) | `russia_letters_and_briefings/S_2022_393.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S/2022/393&l=en&t=pdf |
| 11 | Russian MoD English text of the 31 March 2022 Kirillov briefing | `russia_letters_and_briefings/Kirillov_briefing_2022-03-31_milru.txt` | https://eng.mil.ru/en/special_operation/news/more.htm?id=12415508@egNews (read through the Internet Archive copy at https://web.archive.org/web/2022/https://eng.mil.ru/en/special_operation/news/more.htm?id=12415508@egNews because the live site did not load) |
| 12 | **Russia's actual document scans**, the 184-page annex Russia gave the Geneva treaty meeting ("WP2 annexes") | `bwc_2022_geneva/WP2-annexes-for-website.pdf` (14 MB) | https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/WP2-annexes-for-website.pdf |
| 13 | Geneva Article V meeting working papers BWC/CONS/2022/WP.1–40, 47, 48, 48/Rev.1, 62–65 (Russia, US, Ukraine, EU, China and others) | `bwc_2022_geneva/BWC_CONS_2022_WP.*.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=BWC/CONS/2022/WP.4&l=en&t=pdf (same pattern for each number) |
| 14 | Geneva meeting final report (BWC/CONS/2022/3) + advance version | `bwc_2022_geneva/BWC_CONS_2022_3.pdf`, `FCM_final_report_advance.pdf` | https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=BWC/CONS/2022/3&l=en&t=pdf ; https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/FCM-final-report-ADVANCE-VERSION.pdf |
| 15 | Nuland, 8 March 2022 Senate testimony: written statement + Q&A excerpt and video links | `nuland_senate_2022-03-08/` | https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030822_Nuland_Testimony1.pdf ; https://www.c-span.org/clip/senate-committee/senator-rubio-questions-undersecretary-nuland-over-biolabs-in-ukraine/5005520 |
| 16 | DoD fact sheets, 11 March and 9 June 2022 | `us_government/` | https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/11/2002954612/-1/-1/0/FACT-SHEET-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE'S-COOPERATIVE-THREAT-REDUCTION-PROGRAM-BIOLOGICAL-THREAT-REDUCTION-PROGRAM-ACTIVITIES-IN-UKRAINE.PDF ; https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/article/3057517/fact-sheet-on-wmd-threat-reduction-efforts-with-ukraine-russia-and-other-former/ |
| 17 | Hunter Biden / Metabiota: NY Post article with email | `hunter_biden_metabiota/` | see section 5 |

| # | Document | File (under `primary_sources/`) | Original URL |
|---|---|---|---|
| | images, laptop email thread text, PolitiFact, Washington Post (paywalled stub), GAI | | |
| 18 | Independent analysis: SIPRI Yearbook 2023 chapter; WHO "destroy pathogens" report | `independent_analysis/` | https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB23c09sII.pdf ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/11/who-says-it-advised-ukraine-to-destroy-pathogens-in-health-labs |

**Not obtained:** - The Russian MoD's own document folder for the 17 March 2022 briefing on Yandex Disk (https://disk.yandex.ru/d/ndINmQKPfDRM0w). I saw it listed in search results but did not download it. - The 24 March 2022 Kirillov "flowchart" linking Biden and Soros to the labs. I know it only from PolitiFact's description. - The full Washington Post fact check (paywalled; only the first lines loaded). - The original Daily Mail article. - The C-SPAN clip page (blocked my automated fetch). - An official Senate transcript of the Nuland Q&A. I didn't find one. - Any congressional release of the Metabiota emails. I didn't find one.

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# 3. Document-by-document check

## 3.1 The 2005 US DoD – Ukraine Ministry of Health agreement

- **Authentic?** Yes. Russia's annex reproduces it from the US State Department treaty series ("TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 05-829", signed at Kyiv 29 August 2005; WP2 annexes pp. 1–9). The US quotes the same agreement in its own reply (BWC/CONS/2022/WP.4, paras 10–13).
- **What it literally says.** The Ukrainian health ministry "shall transfer to the U.S. Department of Defense *requested copies* of dangerous pathogen strains collected in Ukraine for cooperative biological research … in U.S. Department of Defense-designated laboratories in the United States for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes" (Article IV, para 5; WP2 annexes p. 7). Its stated purpose is preventing the spread of materials "that could be Used in the Development of Biological Weapons."
- **Russia's claim.** The agreement requires transfer of "the samples of *all* strains collected in Ukraine," and results are "sensitive or restricted by default" (S/2022/796, p. 1).
- **Check.** The text says "requested copies," not all strains. The US says transfers were "infrequent and always conducted with the consent of the Ukrainian government" (WP.4 para 12). That is the US's word; I found no independent audit of how many samples actually went to the US. On secrecy, the US says Article VII only requires marking information that either side deems sensitive (WP.4 para 13).
- **Documented vs. interpretation.** Strain-sharing with Pentagon-designated labs is documented. That it served weapons work is interpretation.

## 3.2 The DTRA / Black & Veatch contract (HDTRA1-08-D-0007-0004) and the "Ministry of Defence labs"

- **What it shows.** Ukraine's project registration card No. 3253-10 (Russian unofficial translation) lists the donor as "The U.S. Government via the U.S Department of Defense/the Defense Threat Reduction Agency" and the contractor as Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. The program is the "Cooperative Biological Engagement Program." The estimated value is **$31,807,000**, the period is 6 March 2015 – 31 October 2020, and the beneficiaries are the food-safety service, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Health. Its stated objective is "to maintain labs built and modernized with donor assistance … ensure rapid response to outbreaks … develop and accompany joint research projects" (WP2 annexes pp. 78–82). A related "Plan to

provide technical assistance to certain recipients of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine" lists goals such as "improving the ability … to detect and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases" and "achieving Euro-Atlantic and Ukrainian biosafety and biosecurity standards" (pp. 16–24).

- **Russia's claim.** "The real recipients of funds are laboratories of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence located in Kiev, Lvov, Odessa and Kharkov." By 2020, 30 labs in 14 communities were involved (S/2022/796; Kirillov 17 March briefing in S/2022/244).
- **US response.** The US does not deny the contract. It calls it a 2018 planning document. It says the activities were "'military' only in the sense that they are activities performed by the Ministry of Defense," namely mobile diagnostics and the MoD's regional sanitary-epidemiological units, later broadened to health and food-safety labs (WP.4 para 15). DoD's March 2022 fact sheet had already said BTRP had "a limited engagement with Ministry of Defense confined to providing mobile diagnostic laboratories" (DoD fact sheet, 11 Mar 2022).
- **Documented vs. interpretation.** Pentagon money going to Ukrainian military medical and epidemiology units is documented and admitted. The documents I read describe equipment, upkeep, training, biosafety and outbreak response. They do not describe weapons development.

### 3.3 The Odesa Mechnikov Anti-Plague Institute inspection report (2018)

- **What it shows.** It is a Ukrainian health-ministry working-group report on how the Institute stored its national-heritage microbe collection (WP2 annexes pp. 47–77, in English, Russian and Ukrainian). It counts 654 bacterial strains, including *B. anthracis* 32, *F. tularensis* 189 and *Vibrio cholerae* O1 422, plus tick-borne encephalitis viruses and others. It records storage and record-keeping problems, such as visible growth in some tubes and no genome sequencing since 2015.
- **Russia's claim.** The quantities and "same strains of different passages" don't fit peaceful purposes, and the pathogens don't match Ukraine's real health problems such as measles and polio (S/2022/796, questions 1.1–1.5).
- **US response.** This is a Ukrainian document about a Ukrainian-owned lab. Anthrax is endemic in Ukrainian animals, cholera outbreaks continue in Ukraine, and no rule limits labs to locally common diseases (WP.4 paras 16–17).
- **My read.** An anti-plague institute's reference collection would be expected to hold plague-family, cholera, anthrax and tularemia strains. That is its official job under a 1994 Cabinet resolution cited in the report itself (p. 50). The report does document poor record-keeping and biosafety, which is a fair criticism. It does not document production or weaponisation.

### 3.4 Bird and bat projects (UP-4, P-781, "Flu-Flyway")

- **What they are.** UP-4 is "Risk Assessment of Selected Especially Dangerous Pathogens Potentially Carried by Migratory Birds over Ukraine," a DTRA-funded project (US WP.4 para 18). P-781 is a project agreement through the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine with Ukraine's veterinary institute and Georgia's Lugar Center, studying infections from insectivorous bats (WP2 annexes pp. 116–122). **Flu-Flyway** turns out not to be a Pentagon project at all. Russia's own annex shows it is a pre-proposal to the European ICRAD animal-disease research call, led by Linnaeus University (Sweden) with partners in Lithuania, Italy, Spain, the Max Planck Institute (Germany) and Ukraine's Kharkiv veterinary institute. It requested €1.31 million for 2021–2024 to track mallards carrying bird flu (pp. 91–115).
- **Russia's claim.** Birds and bats "can be considered as a means of delivery" (S/2022/796). Birds ringed in Kherson were caught in Russia (S/PV.8991).
- **US response.** These are standard zoonotic-disease surveillance studies of the kind the WHO encourages, and Russia does them too (WP.4 paras 18–20).

- **Documented vs. interpretation.** The projects are documented as surveillance research. The "delivery means" idea is Russia's interpretation. I found nothing in these documents about releasing or modifying birds or bats.

### 3.5 UP-8 (Crimean-Congo fever / hantavirus / leptospirosis) and the ethics-committee paper

- **Russia's claim.** A 12 June 2019 ethics approval required death of a participant to be reported within 24 hours. Kirillov said: "We do not exclude that … volunteers were infected" (31 March briefing; S/2022/284).
- **Check.** By Russia's own account, the research program "assumes only a standard procedure for blood sampling." The infection claim is Russia's stated speculation ("do not exclude"), not something the document shows.

### 3.6 Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Kherson memos, 2016–2017

- **What they say.** These are unofficial translations supplied by Russia, so authenticity is not independently confirmed (WP2 annexes pp. 145–177). They are regional security assessments of lab safety. The key passage is hedged: Black & Veatch's program "is *likely*" to allow study of local strains, "the next stage … *may* be," results would "*probably*" go to the US, and "It is *possible* that … a foreign party would study their own test systems." The concern is foreign access and control over Ukrainian labs. One memo's passage on possible epidemics from a pathogen leak ends with the words "generally assessed as satisfactory" (p. 148).
- **Check.** Even taken at face value, these are one regional office's suspicions, not evidence of weapons work. Ukraine called the origin of Russia's "evidence" "highly doubtful" (BWC/CONS/2022/WP.21).

### 3.7 US patent 8,967,029 (insect-spreading drone)

- **Real?** Yes, a 2015 US patent to a private inventor (Calvert), reproduced in WP2 annexes pp. 140–144.
- **Russia's claim.** A patent proves a working device exists (S/2022/796).
- **US response.** A US patent does not authorise making anything, no prototype is required, "no such device was constructed," and building it as a weapon would be a federal crime. The US also says Russia has granted similar patents (WP.4 paras 21–23).

### 3.8 Drones and aerosol tanks

- **Russia's claim.** Three drones with 30-litre containers were found in Kherson on 9 March 2022 and 10 more near Kakhovka. Motor Sich asked Baykar on 15 December 2021 whether an Akinci drone could carry a 20+ litre aerosol system (S/2022/796; S/2022/393).
- **Check.** I found no independent verification of the drone finds. The quoted request, as Russia describes it, does not mention biological agents.

### 3.9 Blood-serum samples and "ethnic weapons"

- **Russia's claim.** Thousands of serum samples "mostly of Slavic extraction" went to Walter Reed, and "in theory" ethnically targeted agents could be developed (S/PV.8991). It also says 3,500 sera went to a German Bundeswehr institute in 2016–2019 (S/2022/393).
- **Check.** No document I opened shows anything beyond sample collection. The ethnic-weapon idea is stated by Russia as a theoretical possibility.

### 3.10 The destruction of pathogens on 24 February 2022

- **Documented.** The WHO told Reuters it had "strongly recommended" that Ukraine "destroy high-threat pathogens to prevent any potential spills" (Reuters via Al Jazeera, 11 Mar 2022). DoD said the Ukrainian Health Ministry "ordered the safe and secure disposal of samples" after the invasion (DoD fact sheet, 11 Mar 2022). Kirillov said part of the collection "was exported to the USA" and the rest destroyed (31 March briefing).
- **Interpretation.** Russia calls it a cover-up. The WHO and the US call it standard wartime biosafety. The destruction itself is not disputed.

### 3.11 Claims about drug companies and "Democratic Party" funds (May 2022)

Kirillov's 11 May briefing (S/2022/393) says funds "of the Clintons, the Rockefellers, Soros and Biden" were raised and that Pfizer, Moderna, Merck and Gilead were involved in testing drugs "in circumvention of international safety standards." The letter text I read contains assertions but no supporting document for these specific claims. Nothing I found in any of these documents concerns COVID vaccines or spike proteins.

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## 4. What the UN, the treaty meeting and the Security Council actually concluded

- **UN disarmament chief, 11 March 2022.** Izumi Nakamitsu said: "The United Nations is not aware of any biological weapons programmes." She pointed states to the treaty's own complaint procedures (S/PV.8991, p. 3). On **18 March** she added: "the United Nations currently has neither the mandate nor the technical or operational capacity to investigate that information" (S/PV.8999). UN disarmament official Mr. Ebo repeated both points on 27 October (S/PV.9171). **This is the important nuance: the UN did not investigate and clear the labs. It said it had no information about a weapons program and no power to look.**
- **US at the Council.** "There are no Ukrainian biological weapons laboratories supported by the United States" (S/PV.9171; similar on 11 March per the UN summary).
- **Treaty (BWC) Article V meeting, Geneva, 26 August and 5–9 September 2022.** 89 states took part, and Russia, the US and Ukraine presented. The final report: "**No consensus was reached regarding the outcome**" (para 10). The meeting did not rule on compliance either way (BWC/CONS/2022/3). SIPRI's count: 42 states rejected Russia's allegations, and 8 (Belarus, China, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe) said questions remained without accusing the US or Ukraine of violation. Russia was alone in alleging a breach (SIPRI Yearbook 2023). The US noted that some documents Russia first sent were "unreadable or virtually unreadable" (WP.4 para 3).
- **Security Council, Article VI complaint.** Russia filed a formal complaint on 24 October 2022 (S/2022/796). Its draft to set up an investigating commission (S/2022/821) failed on 2 November 2022: **2 for (Russia, China), 3 against (US, UK, France), 10 abstaining** (UN press release; S/PV.9180). France said it had "evaluated the so-called evidence in detail" and found the allegations unfounded. Mexico abstained because Russia had not provided the evidence the treaty requires. China voted yes because Russia's questions "were not answered" (UN press release). This was the first time Article VI had been used, and no investigation was ever opened.

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## 5. Hunter Biden, Rosemont Seneca and Metabiota

**Documented:** - Rosemont Seneca Technology Partners (RSTP), an affiliate of Hunter Biden's firm, invested in Metabiota. A 2014 RSTP memo described investments that would bring its stake to 13.4% (PolitiFact, 1 Apr 2022, citing the Washington Post). The NY Post put RSTP's own investment at $500,000 and said it helped raise millions more (NY Post, 26 Mar 2022). - Metabiota was a DTRA subcontractor in Ukraine under Black & Veatch, doing training, biosafety and diagnostics support until 2020 (PolitiFact, quoting Metabiota and DTRA's Robert Pope). Federal records show about $18.4 million from DoD for 2014–2017, of which $307,091 was itemised for "Ukraine research projects" (PolitiFact). The NY Post cites a $23.9 million award in 2014 with the same $307,091 Ukraine line. The two outlets' totals differ, but both put the Ukraine-specific line at $307,091. - **The laptop emails (April 2014).** Metabiota VP Mary Guttieri sent Hunter Biden a memo on how Metabiota could help "assert Ukraine's cultural and economic independence from Russia" (quoted by the NY Post). Burisma executive Vadym Pozharskyi then wrote about the "as you called, 'Science Ukraine' project." Hunter Biden forwarded the thread, asking Metabiota to "respond ASAP … and keep the momentum up." The thread text is in `hunter_biden_metabiota/Laptop_email_2014-04-09_Ukraine_Science_thread.txt`, from an unofficial archive (bidenlaptopemails.com). Its wording matches the NY Post's quotes. The Washington Post reported that thousands of laptop emails could be cryptographically verified (WaPo, 30 Mar 2022). I did not confirm whether this particular thread was among them. - **A detail in the email itself.** Pozharskyi writes: "As I understand the Metabiota was a subcontract to principal contactor of the DoD B&V. Today they seem to state that **financing is closed**… They look for a new financing." So in April 2014 Metabiota was looking for new business. The email does not show anyone financing labs.

**Disputed or unsupported:** - Kirillov's claim that Biden's fund "financed the Pentagon's military biological program" (31 March briefing; S/2022/284). Metabiota told PolitiFact its Ukraine work was "fully financed by the DTRA, with no money from private investments." DTRA said it was "unaware of any direct connection between Hunter Biden and the work Metabiota performed at the labs." The Washington Post reported Hunter Biden was not on RSTP's investment committee for Metabiota and was removed from the firm (via PolitiFact; the WaPo fact check itself was paywalled for me). - Nothing I found shows Joe Biden financing these labs. - PolitiFact notes it could not verify the laptop emails itself.

**Fair summary.** Hunter Biden's network invested in and promoted a Pentagon subcontractor, and he tried to connect it with Burisma. That is a real conflict-of-interest story. It is not evidence that he paid for weapons research. In this case the money ran from the Pentagon to the contractor.

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## 6. Nuland's testimony (8 March 2022)

Asked by Sen. Rubio whether Ukraine had chemical or biological weapons, Nuland said: "Ukraine has biological research facilities, which, in fact, we are quite concerned that Russian troops, Russian forces may be seeking to gain control of. So we are working with the Ukrainians on how they can prevent any of those research materials from falling into the hands of Russian forces" (Newsweek). The State Department then said she meant "diagnostic and biodefense laboratories … which are not biological weapons facilities" (same article). Her written testimony does not mention labs (PDF). The labs' existence had already been public through DoD. Her remark confirmed that the US was worried about dangerous materials in them, not that they were weapons sites.

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## 7. Strongest points on each side

**Strongest points for Russia's suspicions:** 1. The Pentagon, not a health agency, ran and paid for this work, through defence contractors (Black & Veatch, Metabiota, CH2M Hill), including support to Ukraine's Ministry of

Defence (documented; the US admits it). 2. The 2005 agreement lets DoD request copies of dangerous strains for DoD-designated labs in the US, and allows results to be marked sensitive (documented). 3. The labs held collections of anthrax, cholera and tularemia, and Russia says some projects covered pathogens with no recorded local cases, for example glanders under TAP-6 (Russia's claim in S/2022/796). The Odesa inspection found poor record-keeping and biosafety (documented, though the reasons are disputed). 4. The US does not report this overseas work in its BWC confidence-building declarations (the US says the forms don't require it; WP.4 para 14). 5. The UN never investigated, the Geneva meeting reached no consensus, and the Security Council declined to investigate. So there has never been an independent on-site inspection.

**Strongest points against the weapons claim:** 1. None of the documents Russia published shows weapon production, weaponisation, stockpiling or delivery tied to these labs. The documents describe surveillance, diagnostics, biosafety and training. 2. Several of Russia's readings don't match the documents' own text: "all strains" vs. "requested copies," the hedged wording of the SBU memos, Flu-Flyway being an EU-funded Swedish-led project, and the UP-8 volunteer infection claim being openly speculative. 3. Ukraine has no BSL-4 lab (Ukraine, WP.21), and the work was published and shared with the WHO and others (DoD fact sheets). 4. Russia itself was the program's "foundational partner" and hosted similar DoD-funded work until 2014 (WP.4 para 8; DoD fact sheet). 5. 42 states rejected Russia's case at Geneva, and only China joined Russia in the Security Council vote. Russia made these claims while at war with Ukraine.

**Still unproven or unknown:** - What happened to every sample sent to the US. There has been no independent audit. - The full scope and results of each UP and TAP project. Many results are not public. - Whether the Russian scans are complete and unaltered. Some were originally unreadable, and most are "unofficial translations." - Russia's drone claims.

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## 8. Sources opened for this report

UN and treaty: S/PV.8991 · S/PV.8999 · S/PV.9033 · S/PV.9171 · S/PV.9180 · S/2022/796 · S/2022/821 · S/2022/244 · S/2022/284 · S/2022/393 · UN press release SC/15095 · UN AV summary 11 Mar 2022 · Security Council Report, 2 Nov 2022 · WP2 annexes · BWC/CONS/2022/WP.4 (US) · WP.21 (Ukraine) · BWC/CONS/2022/3 · FCM advance report

Russia: Kirillov 31 Mar 2022 (archive)

US: DoD fact sheet 11 Mar 2022 · DoD fact sheet 9 Jun 2022 · Nuland written testimony

Media and analysis: Newsweek 9 Mar 2022 · NY Post 26 Mar 2022 · PolitiFact 1 Apr 2022 · Washington Post 29 Mar 2022 (paywalled) · GAI 20 Sep 2022 · Laptop email archive · SIPRI Yearbook 2023 · Reuters/Al Jazeera 11 Mar 2022

*Washington Post laptop-verification article (30 Mar 2022) is cited from its search-result summary; I did not open the full article.*