By the spring of 1943, a few years into the war, the first large-scale tabun factory near Dyhernfurth, a small town 40 km away from what is now Wrocław, Poland, was producing 350 metric tons (350,000 kg) of tabun per month. By the end of the war, the factory had produced 12,000 metric tons of tabun and loaded it into aerial bombs and artillery shells.
Despite all the effort expended on tabun, by the war’s midpoint, it was becoming increasingly clear to military researchers that sarin was a better chemical weapon: Sarin was more volatile and toxic than tabun, even though sarin was more challenging to manufacture. In 1943, the German military approved construction of an entirely new sarin factory at Falkenhagen, a site 70 km outside Berlin.
From the start of WWII, some in the military were raring to dispatch their nerve weapons “on a very large scale against the enemy hinterland by air strikes,” noted German Colonel Hermann Ochsner in 1939. He said at the time: “There is no doubt that a city like London would be plunged into a state of unbearable turmoil that would bring enormous pressure to bear on the enemy government.” But Hitler demurred, even after Germany’s spectacular defeat at Stalingrad over the winter of 1942–43, which many believe was a turning point in the war. Why did Hitler veto their use?
Some historians point to the fact that Hitler had been a victim of chemical weapons—probably mustard gas—during WWI. As a result of this experience, Hitler believed using poison gas on the battlefield was unethical, an incredibly inconsistent position given his directive to use Zyklon B and other poisonous gases to kill millions of concentration camp prisoners.
>inconsistent position given his directive to use Zyklon B
I saw it in the movies! The claw marks in cement!
